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INTRODUCTION 
On its surface, deferred action is simple: it is a decision by Executive 
Branch officials to postpone deportation proceedings against an 
individual or group that is otherwise eligible to be removed from the 
United States.1 Deferred action is an exercise of the Executive’s 
inherent authority to manage its policies, but is not expressly grounded 
in statute.2 Despite this lack of statutory authority, Congress and the 
Supreme Court have historically recognized deferred action policies. 
Indeed, records of such Executive discretion date back to the early 
twentieth century.3 The Executive, grounding its justification in 
humanitarian concerns, has continued to institute categorical deferred 
action programs well into the modern era.4 Perhaps the most well-
known example of such a program is the deferred action policy known 
as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”). 
This Commentary evaluates the administrative law issues presented 
by the upcoming case DHS v. Regents of the University of California, 
which concerns the 2017 rescission of DACA.5 Importantly, this 
Commentary does not evaluate the legality of DACA itself or argue 
that DACA cannot be rescinded as a matter of Executive discretion. 
Copyright © 2020 Charles Fendrych 
∗ J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2021. 
1. Regents of Univ. Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 487 (9th Cir. 2018).
2.  Id.
3.  Id.
4.  See id. at 489 (noting the implementation of deferred action for victims under the
Violence Against Women Act, victims of human trafficking, foreign students unable to fulfill their 
visa requirements following Hurricane Katrina, and widowed spouses of U.S. citizens who had 
been married for less than two years). 
5.  139 S. Ct. 2779 (mem.) (2019).
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Instead, the focus is on whether the way in which the policy was 
rescinded was appropriate. The primary challenge to the rescission’s 
legality is that DHS based the rescission on a determination that 
maintaining DACA was illegal—instead of rescinding it on policy 
grounds.6 For various reasons, this distinction arguably opens the 
rescission to judicial review and even places its legality in question.7 In 
order to evaluate these concerns, the Supreme Court must first consider 
whether the rescission is subject to judicial review; if review is 
appropriate, the Court must then determine whether the Executive’s 
decision to rescind DACA was arbitrary and capricious under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).8 
I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
announced a policy known as DACA.9 DACA provides that eligible 
individuals brought to the U.S. as children may apply for discretionary 
relief from removal, despite not having lawful immigration status.10 To 
apply, an applicant must: meet certain age restrictions, have maintained 
continuous residence in the U.S. since 2007, and be a current student, a 
high school graduate or equivalent, or an honorably discharged service 
member.11 In addition, to qualify an applicant cannot have a significant 
criminal record or pose a threat to national security or public safety.12 
If approved, deportation proceedings against the individual are 
deferred for two years, subject to renewal.13 Approval does not, 
however, confer lawful immigration status: deferral can be revoked and 
does not provide a pathway to citizenship.14 
6.  See infra Part IV.B.
7.  Id.
8.  Regents of Univ. Cal., 908 F.3d at 510.
9.  Brief for Respondents the Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Janet Napolitano, and the City
of San José at 4–5, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. Cal., 139 S. Ct. 2779 (mem.) (filed 
Sept. 27, 2019) (Nos. 18-587, 18-588, and 18-589) [hereinafter Brief for the Respondents]. 
10.  Id. at 5.
11.  Id.
12.  Id.
13.  Brief for the Petitioners at 5, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. Cal., 139 S.
Ct. 2779 (mem.) (filed Aug. 19, 2019) (Nos. 18-587, 18-588, and 18-589) [hereinafter Brief for the 
Petitioners]. 
14.  Id.
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In 2014, DHS announced plans to expand DACA and to create a 
new deferred action policy called Deferred Action for Parents of 
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”).15 Under the 
expanded DACA policy, DHS planned to ease the age and residency 
requirements and increase the period of deferred action from two years 
to three years.16 Similarly, DAPA was designed to provide DACA-like 
protections to undocumented parents whose children were U.S. citizens 
or lawful permanent residents.17 
In response, Texas and twenty-five other states brought suit to 
prevent DHS from implementing DAPA and expanding DACA.18 In 
Texas v. United States (Texas I), the Southern District of Texas granted 
a nationwide preliminary injunction.19 The Fifth Circuit affirmed in 
Texas v. United States (Texas II),20 holding that DAPA and the 
expansions to DACA did not allow for sufficiently individualized 
review of applicants and were enacted without proper notice under the 
APA.21 The Supreme Court affirmed in United States v. Texas (Texas 
III),22 but was equally divided and did not issue an opinion.23 Following 
this decision, the petitioners from this line of cases (“the Texas cases”) 
announced their intention to amend their complaint and challenge 
DACA in its entirety.24 
In 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions advised DHS to rescind 
DACA because the policy’s effectuation was unconstitutional.25 In the 
“Sessions Letter,” Sessions warned then-Acting Secretary of 
Homeland Security Elaine Duke that leaving DACA in place risked 
litigation that would mirror Texas II and III “[b]ecause the DACA 
policy has the same legal and constitutional defects that the courts 
recognized as to DAPA.”26 
 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 6. 
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 6. 
 19.  86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015). 
 20.  809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 21.  Id. at 175–78. 
 22.  136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam). 
 23.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 7. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  LETTER FROM ATTORNEY GENERAL SESSIONS TO ACTING SECRETARY DUKE 
(September 4, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0904_DOJ_AG-
letter-DACA.pdf [hereinafter Sessions Letter]. 
 26.  Id. 
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The next day, Acting Secretary Duke issued the “Duke 
Memorandum” rescinding DACA.27 The Duke Memorandum 
instructed DHS to stop accepting new DACA applications and limited 
renewal applications.28 Notably, the memorandum justified the 
rescission in just one sentence: “[t]aking into consideration the 
Supreme Court’s and the Fifth Circuit’s rulings in [the Texas cases], and 
the September 4, 2017 letter from the Attorney General, it is clear that 
the June 15, 2012 DACA program should be terminated.”29 
B. Procedural History 
Following DACA’s rescission, various plaintiffs (“Regents”) filed 
suit against DHS in the Northern District of California, the District of 
Columbia, the District of Maryland, and the Eastern District of New 
York.30 
First, Regents argued that DHS’s rescission of DACA was 
reviewable.31 The reviewability was in question because agency 
enforcement decisions are typically left to an agency’s own discretion.32 
Here, however, each court held that the rescission was subject to review 
because DHS’s actions were not based on policy considerations, which 
are normally granted deference.33 Instead, the rescission was premised 
solely on DACA’s supposed illegality, which the courts found to be a 
reviewable legal determination.34 
Second, Regents argued that the rescission was arbitrary and 
capricious in violation of the APA.35 In Regents of University of 
California v. DHS36 and Batalla Vidal v. Trump,37 the New York and 
California district courts held that the rescission was likely arbitrary 
and capricious and issued identical preliminary injunctions.38 
 
 27.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 9. 
 28.  MEMORANDUM ON RESCISSION OF DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS 
(DACA) (September 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-
daca [hereinafter Duke Memorandum]. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 10–13.  
 31.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 8–9. 
 32.  Id. at 9. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  See, e.g., Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 11–12 (discussing how the Ninth 
Circuit held that agency actions based solely on the belief that any other action was foreclosed by 
law are not considered discretionary and are not granted deference); see infra Part III. 
 35.  Id. at 8–9. 
 36.  279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1049–50 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
 37.  279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 438 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 38.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 9. 
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Additionally, both courts found that the rescission violated the APA 
because the administrative record explaining DHS’s rationale was 
incomplete.39 Similarly, in NAACP v. Trump,40 the D.C. district court 
found that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious because DHS’s 
stated rationale was insufficient to explain the change.41 However, 
rather than issuing an injunction, the district court issued a stay, giving 
DHS ninety days to better explain its original decision or issue a new 
decision with a clearer rationale.42 
Within ninety days, then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen 
Nielsen issued the “Nielsen Memorandum” to the general public, 
describing several reasons for the rescission.43 First, Nielsen explained 
that rescinding DACA was justified because DHS should not adopt 
non-enforcement policies for broad classes of aliens.44 Second, DHS 
should use its discretionary non-enforcement only on an individualized 
basis.45 Third, DHS needed to “project a message” that it will 
consistently and transparently enforce immigration law.46 After 
considering the Nielsen Memorandum, the D.C. district court issued a 
preliminary injunction against DHS.47 The court reasoned that, like the 
Duke Memorandum, the Nielsen Memorandum was based on the 
Texas cases and Attorney General Sessions’s view that DACA was not 
legal.48 Therefore the Nielsen Memorandum was not sufficient to 
explain the change.49 
Several months later, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction 
against DHS in Regents of the University of California v. U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security.50 First, the court affirmed that the 
rescission was reviewable, holding that agency actions based solely on 
 
 39.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 55. 
 40.  298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 241 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 41.  Brief for the States of N.Y., Mass., Wash., Colo., Conn., Del., Haw., Ill., Iowa, N.M., 
N.C., Or., Pa., R.I., Vt., and Va., and the District of Columbia, Respondents in No. 18-589 at 12, 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. Cal., 139 S. Ct. 2779 (mem.) (filed Sept. 27, 2019) 
(Nos. 18-587, 18-588, and 18-589) [hereinafter Brief for the Respondents in No. 18-589]. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 10. 
 44.  MEMORANDUM FROM SECRETARY KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN (June 22, 2018), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/18_0622_S1_Memorandum_DACA.pdf 
[hereinafter Nielsen Memorandum]. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 12. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  908 F.3d 476, 510 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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the belief that any other action was foreclosed to them by law are not 
discretionary and are not granted deference.51 Second, the court 
affirmed that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious in violation of 
the APA.52 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit refused to consider the 
Nielsen Memorandum, viewing it as an impermissible post hoc 
rationalization.53 
In November 2018, DHS filed a petition for certiorari in Regents, 
and sought certiorari before judgment in NAACP and Batalla Vidal.54 
In June 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari for all three.55 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Reviewability of Agency Actions Under the Administrative 
Procedure Act 
Regents contend that DHS’s rescission of DACA is reviewable 
under the APA’s provision that “[a] person suffering legal wrong 
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency 
action . . . is entitled to judicial review thereof.”56 Interpreting this, the 
Supreme Court has consistently articulated a strong presumption that 
agency actions will be subject to judicial review.57 Nevertheless, this 
presumption is rebuttable and fails when it is clear from a statute that 
Congress intended the agency to address such concerns internally.58 
Specifically, APA § 701(a)(2) provides that judicial review is foreclosed 
to the extent that “agency action is committed to agency discretion by 
law.”59 However, this exception is construed narrowly and only applies 
where “statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there 
 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. For a more in-depth discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s holding, see infra Part III. 
 53.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 13. 
 54.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 14. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
 57.  See, e.g., Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2015) (quoting Bowen v. 
Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298–99 
(2001); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 190 (1995) (applying this presumption in the immigration 
context). 
 58.  Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. at 1651. 
 59.  5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012). 
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is no law to apply.”60 Courts still decide any and all relevant legal 
questions.61 
In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court clarified that the § 
701(a)(2) exception encompasses an agency’s discretionary decision 
not to investigate, enforce, or prosecute the substantive law.62 Such a 
decision is generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion 
unless Congress has indicated otherwise.63 The Court found a 
“tradition” of extending deference to such decisions as they often 
involve a “complicated balancing of factors which are peculiarly within 
[the agency’s] expertise.”64 Additionally, the Court noted that agency 
inaction generally does not impose coercive power on the rights of 
individuals and typically needs less judicial review.65 
In Chaney, the Supreme Court explicitly chose not to answer 
whether “a refusal by [an] agency to institute proceedings based solely 
on the belief that it lacks jurisdiction” would be subject to review under 
§ 701(a)(2).66 The answer is relevant because how an agency interprets 
its jurisdiction is no different from how an agency interprets the scope 
of its authority.67 The Supreme Court has never decided the issue, 
though some circuit courts have determined that such decisions are 
reviewable.68 
ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers69 (“BLE”) debatably 
clarifies Chaney’s lack of guidance.70 In BLE, the Supreme Court held 
that highlighting a reviewable rationale put forth by an agency taking 
 
 60.  Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting S. REP. 
NO. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1954)); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985) 
(“[R]eview is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful 
standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”). 
 61.  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 62.  470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 831–32. 
 65.  Id. at 832. 
 66.  Id. at 833 n.4 (emphasis added). 
 67.  See City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 296–97 (noting that an “agency’s 
interpretation of . . . the scope of [its] authority” is no different from an interpretation of “its 
jurisdiction”). 
 68.  See, e.g., Mont. Air Chapter No. 29 v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 898 F.2d 753, 754 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (holding that Chaney’s presumption of nonreviewability “may be overcome if the 
refusal is based solely on the erroneous belief that the agency lacks jurisdiction”); Int’l 
Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 785 F.2d 1098, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that 
agency nonenforcement decisions are reviewable when they are based on a belief that the agency 
lacks jurisdiction). 
 69.  482 U.S. 270 (1987). 
 70.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 25–26; contra Brief for the Respondents, supra 
note 9, at 24–25. 
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action that is otherwise unreviewable does not impact the action’s 
reviewability.71 For example, questionable reasons behind an agency’s 
action will not bear on the action’s reviewability if taking the action 
falls within a tradition of nonreviewability.72 What matters is the 
agency’s formal action, not how the decision was made.73 In BLE, the 
Court held that an agency decision not to reconsider a final action was 
otherwise unreviewable.74 As in Chaney, the Court reasoned that the 
action fell within a “tradition of nonreviewability.”75 
B. The Rescission’s Legality 
1. Legality under the APA 
Regents also challenge DHS’s rescission of DACA under the 
APA’s requirement that agency action be held unlawful and set aside 
if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not otherwise in 
accordance with the law.”76 This consideration is made with review of 
the whole record or, at minimum, those parts that refer to the action’s 
rationale.77 This is a narrow scope of review and courts are not meant 
to simply override an agency’s judgement.78 Nevertheless, the agency’s 
action must be the product of “reasoned decisionmaking [sic].”79 An 
agency must be able to articulate a satisfactory explanation that 
demonstrates consideration of relevant factors without any clear error 
in judgment.80 There must be a rational connection between these 
factors and the action taken.81 Moreover, the explanation must be clear 
enough to be understandable.82 These criteria are meant to check that 
agencies offer genuine justifications for their actions and ensure that 
 
 71.  BLE, 482 U.S. at 283. 
 72.  Id.  
 73.  Id. at 281. 
 74.  Id. at 282. 
 75.  Id.  
 76.  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) (“[A]n order 
may not stand if the agency has misconceived the law.”). 
 77.  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 78.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 79.  Id. at 52. 
 80.  Id. at 42–43. 
 81.  Id. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 
(1962)).   
 82.  SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196–97 (1947). 
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the Executive remains accountable to the courts and the general 
public.83 
2. Legality of Post Hoc Justifications in the Common Law 
Regents argue the Nielsen Memorandum should be excluded as an 
impermissible post hoc rationalization because administrative law 
requires that courts consider only the agency’s contemporaneous 
explanation when reviewing an agency’s action.84 Accordingly, these 
determinations must be made by considering only the existing 
administrative record.85 Under a narrow exception to this rule, a court 
can “remand to the agency for a fuller explanation of the agency’s 
reasoning at the time of the agency action.”86 However, the court may 
only do this to clarify the agency’s reasoning when “there was such 
failure to explain administrative action as to frustrate effective judicial 
reviw.”87 Once the reason behind the action is identified, any 
subsequent explanation cannot cite additional rationales.88 
Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission 
states that an agency official’s interpretation of the agency’s own 
regulation can be a form of agency action—”not a post hoc 
rationalization”—and is therefore permissible.89 For example, in 
Martin, the relevant statute granted the Secretary of Labor the power 
to interpret the meaning of the agency’s rules.90 Therefore, the Court 
deferred to the Secretary’s “reasonable” interpretation of an 
ambiguous regulation, considering it agency action.91 
III. HOLDING 
This section focuses on the holding of the Ninth Circuit because it 
was the only circuit court to rule before certiorari was granted. The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment in Batalla Vidal and 
 
 83.  See Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019) (stating that 
agency rationales must be clear enough to ensure that agencies put forth “genuine justifications 
for important decisions . . . that can be scrutinized by courts and the general public”). 
 84.  Id. at 2573; see also Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 169 
(1962) (stating if agency action is to be upheld, it should be “on the same basis articulated in the 
order by the agency itself”).  
 85.  Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2573. 
 86.  Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990). 
 87.  Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142–43 (1973). 
 88.  Id. at 143. 
 89.  499 U.S. 144, 156–57 (1991). 
 90.  Id. at 152. 
 91.  Id. at 158–59. 
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NAACP, in which both the Second Circuit and the D.C. Circuit Court 
had heard oral arguments on appeal but had not yet rendered 
decisions.92 However, the Supreme Court granted certiorari after the 
Ninth Circuit issued its ruling in Regents.93 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s injunction against the 
rescission of DACA.94 The court concluded that Chaney’s protections 
against judicial review did not apply when an agency acted solely out 
of the belief that it had no other legal option.95 This conclusion, paired 
with the APA’s strong presumption towards judicial review, guided the 
court’s determination that DACA’s rescission was reviewable.96 The 
court determined that the Acting Secretary based the rescission solely 
on an incorrect belief that DACA was illegal.97 Because the court 
determined that DACA’s creation was a permissible exercise of 
executive discretion, any rationale for the rescission that was based on 
DACA’s illegality was found to be insufficient.98 Therefore, DHS’s 
actions likely satisfied the arbitrary and capricious claim and fulfilled 
the criteria for an injunction.99 The court dismissed arguments 
concerning notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA.100 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioner’s Arguments 
1. The Rescission is not Reviewable 
First, DHS argues rescission is not judicially reviewable because, 
under the APA, such action was “committed to agency discretion by 
law.”101 The decision to rescind DACA falls within a tradition of agency 
discretion, given the similarities between the current case and 
Chaney.102 Here, DHS’s decision to retain DACA (a policy of non-
enforcement) is akin to the decision in Chaney to adopt a policy of non-
 
 92.  Brief for the Respondents in No. 18-589, supra note 41, at 13. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Regents of Univ. Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 520 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 95.  Id. at 497. 
 96.  Id. at 497–98. 
 97.  Id. at 503. 
 98.  Id. at 510. 
 99.  Regents of Univ. Cal., 908 F.3d at 510–12. 
 100.  Id. at 512–18. 
 101.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 17 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012)). 
 102.  Id. at 18.  
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enforcement.103 Both decisions require “complicated balancing” within 
the particular expertise of an agency.104 They merit balancing given the 
wide range of acceptable considerations, which include the proper 
allocation of resources and overall agency policies.105 Additionally, the 
abandonment a nonenforcement policy lacks a final adverse order and 
thus does not invoke the agency’s coercive power, reducing the need 
for judicial oversight.106 Given that the decision to rescind DACA was 
committed to agency discretion by law, there are no relevant legal 
considerations for the court absent a statutory directive circumscribing 
DHS’s traditional discretion.107 
Second, DHS believes that BLE resolves Chaney’s decision not to 
rule on the reviewability of agency decisions based solely on the belief 
that other courses of action are foreclosed to the agency by law.108 Here, 
Chaney’s gap is irrelevant because BLE states that agency actions that 
fall within a “tradition of nonreviewability” are not made reviewable 
simply because the agency gives an otherwise reviewable justification 
for taking the action.109 Even if DHS’s stated rationale for rescinding 
DACA is in question, the action itself was committed to agency 
discretion, so the rationale has no bearing on its reviewability.110 
2. The Rescission was Legal 
First, DHS argues that a fair reading of the Duke Memorandum 
shows that the rescission was never based solely on a legal conclusion 
that DACA was illegal.111 Instead, the decision was justified by DHS’s 
“serious doubts about the lawfulness of the policy and the litigation 
risks in maintaining it.”112 DHS was not confident in the legality of 
DACA following the repeal of DAPA and feared that maintaining a 
legally questionable policy could undermine public confidence in 
DHS.113 
 
 103.  Id. at 19. 
 104.  Id. (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985)). 
 105.  Id. at 22. 
 106.  Id. at 19. 
 107.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 19. 
 108.  Id. at 23–25. 
 109.  Id. at 23. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 26.  
 112.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 33.  
 113.  Id. 
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Second, DHS argues that the Nielsen Memorandum further 
articulates these reasons and should be considered.114 DHS asserts that 
the Nielsen Memorandum is not a post hoc rationalization because it is 
the Acting Secretary explaining her own reasoning and therefore “is 
agency action.”115 Additionally, the policy arguments in the Nielsen 
Memorandum adequately justify rescission on their own.116 
B. Respondents’ Arguments 
1. The Rescission is Reviewable 
Regents argue that the rescission of DACA is reviewable given the 
“strong presumption” that administrative actions are subject to judicial 
review.117 Additionally, agency action based solely on the belief that any 
other course of action was foreclosed as a matter of law is not an 
exercise of agency discretion and is not granted deference.118 Regents 
argue that this is not an instance where there is no “law to apply” 
because the entirety of DHS’s argument relies on interpreting and 
applying the Texas cases.119 By relying on judicial decisions, DHS places 
responsibility on the courts to determine what the law is.120 The courts 
are well equipped to address DACA’s legality and the APA provides 
that the courts are to decide such questions of law.121 Accordingly, 
agency action premised solely on the belief that such action was 
required by law cannot fall within the APA’s narrow § 701(a)(2) 
exception from judicial review because there is no tradition 
demonstrating that such action is “committed to agency discretion by 
law.”122 
In distinguishing Chaney and BLE, Regents note that Chaney 
involved specific enforcement proceedings and describe the action as 
only involving a “one-time enforcement decision,” which is different 
from the ongoing, widespread effects of rescinding DACA.123 First, 
 
 114.  Id. at 28.  
 115.  Id. at 29 (emphasis original). For an example of when agency explanations are agency 
action, see supra Part II.B.2. 
 116.  Id. at 37–42. 
 117.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 17 (quoting Weyerhauser Co. v. U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 370 (2018)). 
 118.  Id.  
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 20 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012)). 
 122.  Id. at 18 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012)). 
 123.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 22.  
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there is no established tradition of non-reviewability for programmatic 
policy decisions.124 Second, the rescission implements an agency’s 
coercive power, unlike in Chaney. Third, Chaney explicitly does not 
apply to agency decisions based solely on the belief that the action was 
required by law.125 Lastly, Regents reject DHS’s interpretation of BLE 
as too broad.126 BLE is “narrow” and limited to “recognized 
categor[ies] of traditionally unreviewable agency action,” which do not 
include the decision to rescind DACA.127 
Regents contend that the Nielsen Memorandum is an 
impermissible post hoc rationalization and that, regardless, Nielsen’s 
rationales do not adequately explain the rescission.128 When reviewing 
agency actions, courts are limited to the reasons the agency gave when 
it took the action in question.129 Agencies cannot alter the rationale for 
their actions amidst review, because otherwise “agencies could render 
briefs, oral argument, and even lower court opinions obsolete by issuing 
post hoc documents unsupported by the administrative record.”130 
These concerns are especially relevant when, as in this case, the record 
is incomplete, because agencies could potentially continuously change 
their rationale while withholding the materials considered by the 
original decisionmaker.131 Either way, the Nielsen Memorandum does 
not impact reviewability because the rescission does not fall within a 
traditionally unreviewable category, and under the APA agency actions 
are reviewed for “abuse of discretion.”132 
2. The Rescission was Illegal 
First, Regents contend that the rescission of DACA was illegal 
because it was arbitrary and capricious and therefore in violation of the 
APA.133 The rescission was not adequately explained because DHS 
failed to clearly disclose the grounds on which the decision was made 
or offer a satisfactory explanation for the rescission.134 The one-
 
 124.  Id. at 23 (noting that DACA’s rescission is programmatic because it impacts nearly 
700,000 people and has widespread indirect effects). 
 125.  Id. at 24. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 25. 
 128.  Id. at 26–30. 
 129.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 27. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 28.  
 132.  Id. at 27. 
 133.  Id. at 31. 
 134.  Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
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sentence explanation in the Duke Memorandum is both superficial and 
inadequate because there is no explanation of how or why the cited 
sources led to the rescission of DACA.135 
Second, Regents further contend that the Nielsen Memorandum is 
a post hoc rationalization and should not be considered, but that, even 
if considered, it does not cure the defects in the rescission’s 
explanation.136 The legal and policy rationales put forward by the 
Nielsen Memorandum “are largely a repackaging of the rationale that 
DACA is unlawful.”137 The only rationale that does not depend on 
DACA’s legality is that DHS needed to “project a message” that they 
will enforce immigration laws.138 This justification is insufficient, 
unreasonable, and lacking in any support from the administrative 
record.139 Regents also note that hundreds of thousands of people living 
in the U.S. rely on DACA.140 
Lastly, Regents argue that the administrative record is incomplete, 
which constitutes a violation of the APA.141 It is implausible that 
DACA was rescinded “based on nothing more than a handful of 
judicial opinions and other public documents.”142 Without access to all 
of the evidence and the analysis behind the rescission, courts are unable 
to determine whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious.143 This 
is especially concerning given evidence that the explanation provided 
by DHS may have been pretextual.144 
 
 135.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 32–33. 
 136.  Id. at 37. 
 137.  Id. at 38. 
 138.  Nielsen Memorandum, supra note 46, at 3. 
 139.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 39. 
 140.  Id. at 40–41. 
 141.  Id. at 55.  
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. at 56. 
 144.  Id. (noting that Jeff Session’s announcement of the rescission stated that DACA “denies 
Americans jobs and contributes to crime” and that President Donald Trump indicated that 
DACA would be rescinded unless funding was received for a border wall with Mexico, neither of 
which are cited in DHS’s reasoning behind the rescission); see also Donald Trump 
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 29, 2017, 5:16 AM), https://goo.gl/aZ19im (“The 
Democrats have been told, and fully understand, that there can be no DACA without the 
desperately needed WALL at the Southern Border and an END to the horrible Chain Migration 
& ridiculous Lottery System of Immigration etc.”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), 
TWITTER (Jan. 23, 2018, 8:07 PM), https://goo.gl/Zz46iq (“[I]f there is no Wall, there is no 
DACA.”). 
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V. ANALYSIS 
A. The Department of Homeland Security’s Decision to Wind Down 
DACA is Judicially Reviewable 
The Supreme Court should review DACA’s rescission because 
neither Chaney nor BLE prohibit it, and review is consistent with 
administrative law objectives repeatedly noted by the Court. Chaney 
identifies one exception to the default rule favoring judicial review of 
agency action: the case in which when an agency exercises its discretion 
to not take certain enforcement actions.145 This is consistent with the 
narrow set of actions committed to agency discretion because agency 
inaction is not typically proscribed by statute, so “there is no law to 
apply.”146 However, the Court explicitly did not answer whether agency 
inaction based “solely on the belief that [the agency] lacks jurisdiction” 
would fall within the scope of this exception.147 This is a logical 
reservation, as such action involves a non-discretionary interpretation 
of the substantive law, which is outside the purview of agency 
expertise.148 Unlike agency inaction rooted in a lack of statutory 
guidance, it is “almost ludicrous to suggest that there is ‘no law to apply’ 
in reviewing whether an agency has reasonably interpreted a law.”149 
Therefore, these questions of law should be reserved for the courts.150 
Similarly, this argument does not conflict with the proposition in 
BLE that “otherwise unreviewable” agency actions stand even when 
an agency provides a reviewable justification.151 In BLE, the Court 
deemed the action “otherwise unreviewable” because of a “tradition” 
of nonreviewability similar to that in Chaney.152 However, the Court 
has explicitly stated that the tradition in Chaney does not encompass 
agency inaction based solely on the agency’s belief that it lacked 
authority to do otherwise.153 For BLE to apply, the Court would need 
to find a separate tradition of nonreviewability for the type of inaction 
at hand. This seems unlikely, given that the basis for deference is often 
 
 145.  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 823 (1985). 
 146.  Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); see also Chaney, 
470 U.S. at 830 (“[R]eview is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no 
meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”). 
 147.  Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4. 
 148.  Regents of Univ. Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 495 (9th Cir. 2018).  
 149.  Int’l Union v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original). 
 150.  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 151.  ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 283 (1987). 
 152.  Id. at 282–83. 
 153.  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985). 
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rooted in a “complicated balancing of factors . . . peculiarly within [the 
agency’s] expertise.”154 Here, DHS cited no policy issues to balance.155 
At issue is whether the Texas cases156 required DHS to rescind DACA, 
and such “questions of law” are generally reserved to the expertise of 
the courts.157 Altogether, given that there is likely no legal barrier to 
judicial review, the “strong presumption favoring judicial review of 
administrative action” should apply here.158 
B. The Department of Homeland Security’s Decision to Wind Down 
DACA was Unlawful 
It is less clear whether DHS’s decision to rescind DACA was illegal, 
especially in light of the Texas cases and the possibility that the Court 
will decide that DACA’s effectuation was illegal regardless. However, 
the case does raise concerns about the lack of clarity and transparency 
in DHS’s justification. 
The analysis in the previous section is dependent on DHS 
rationalizing DACA’s rescission solely on the belief that it is illegal.159 
DHS argues that this is not the case.160 DHS insists that DACA was 
rescinded due to “litigation risks,” but these risks are not mentioned at 
all in the Duke Memorandum.161 Though the Sessions Letter makes 
reference to potential litigation reaching “similar results” to the Texas 
cases, the rest of the letter indicates that this is not an independent 
reason for the rescission but merely a natural consequence of DACA’s 
supposed illegality.162 The only clear rationale asserted in the Sessions 
Letter is that DACA was effectuated without authority and is 
fundamentally unconstitutional.163 Further, the Duke Memorandum 
cites only this letter and the Texas cases in its one-sentence 
justification.164 As Regents point out, this is alarming considering that 
 
 154.  Id. at 831–32. 
 155.  See supra Part I.A (explaining that Duke’s only rationales for the rescission were the 
Texas cases and the Sessions Letter). DHS argues that this is not the case. See infra Part V.B 
(discussing the merits of DHS’s argument). 
 156.  See infra Part V.B (laying out the Texas cases addressing the legality of DAPA and 
proposed expansions to DACA). 
 157.  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 158.  Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2015) (quoting Bowen v. Mich. 
Acad. of Fam. Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)). 
 159.  See supra Part V.A.  
 160.  See supra Part IV.A.  
 161.  Regents of Univ. Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 501 (9th Cir. 2018) 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 8. 
 164.  Id. at 9.  
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no court has ever found a deferred action policy unconstitutional, no 
comparison of DACA and DAPA was provided, and the reasoning 
behind these determinations was not explained.165 
Therefore, as articulated in the Sessions Letter and the Duke 
Memorandum, the rationale behind the rescission cannot rise to the 
level of clarity and “reasoned decisionmaking” required by the APA.166 
The reasoning provided is not sufficient to allow for real “scrutin[y] by 
courts and the general public” because it offers no insight into DHS’s 
decision-making process.167 Therefore, the rescission should be held 
arbitrary and capricious under the APA. 
DHS argues these defects are cured by the Nielsen Memorandum’s 
expanded explanation;168 however, Secretary Nielsen’s post hoc 
rationalizations are not merited under the APA and should be excluded 
from consideration. In violation of one of the foundational principles 
of administrative law,169 the Nielsen Memorandum was not issued 
contemporaneously with the decision to rescind DACA.170 
Additionally, even if the memorandum can be considered necessary for 
a fuller explanation, its explanation impermissibly exceeds the 
reasoning identified in the Duke Memorandum: namely the illegality 
of DACA and its parallels to DAPA.171 
Additionally, DHS’s argument that the Nielsen Memorandum was 
itself agency action fails because it is an overbroad interpretation of the 
principle in Martin.172 In Martin, the then-Secretary’s interpretation of 
an ambiguous law was considered agency action only because the then-
Secretary was statutorily proscribed the power to interpret the 
meaning of agency rules.173 This is inapplicable because there is no 
statute granting the Secretary of Homeland Security the power to 
retroactively justify already explained agency actions. Regardless, even 
if the Nielsen Memorandum is considered, two of its three rationales 
depend on the supposed illegality of DACA and the third is not 
 
 165.  Id. at 8–9. 
 166.  See supra Part II.B. 
 167.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 8–9 (quoting Dep’t of Commerce v. New 
York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019)). 
 168.  See supra Part IV.A.  
 169.  See supra Part II.C. (quoting Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 
(2019)).  
 170.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 28. 
 171.  See supra Part II.C.  
 172.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 173.  Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Rev. Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 152 (1991). 
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presented as independently sufficient grounds for rescission.174 
Accordingly, the Nielsen Memorandum presents the same defects as 
the Duke Memorandum and does not rise to the level of clarity and 
rationalism required by the APA.175 
On a policy level, Regents accurately note that post hoc 
explanations are especially problematic “where, as here, courts have 
found that the administrative record is incomplete.”176 If DHS’s 
explanations are not found to be arbitrary and capricious, the Court 
should order the record be made complete in compliance with the 
APA.177 The Court should not allow DHS to “manipulate judicial 
review by changing the rationale for its decisions while withholding the 
full administrative record that was before the original 
decisionmaker.”178 By affirming review over a complete and clear 
record, the Court will promote the Executive Branch’s accountability, 
ensure political oversight over federal agencies, and affirm the 
fundamental, democratic obligations the Executive owes to the 
public.179 
CONCLUSION 
DHS based its rescission of DACA on a claim that it was required 
to do so by law instead of rescinding it on policy grounds. In doing so, 
DHS stripped itself of the protections typically afforded to agency 
decisions. The rationale DHS has put forth is too limited to be clearly 
understandable and offers such insufficient evidence of its decision-
making that the rescission should be deemed arbitrary and capricious. 
For these reasons, the Supreme Court should affirm the injunction 
against DHS. This would force DHS to either reattempt the rescission 
as a matter of clear policy or let DACA remain in place. 
 
 
 174.  See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 29 (arguing that  Nielsen’s statement that 
DHS should only enforce laws enforced by Congress rests on a legal conclusion regarding 
DACA’s inconsistency with said laws, that Nielsen’s statement that DHS should implement 
deferred action on an individualized basis rests on a conclusion that DACA cannot be applied in 
such a manner, and that Nielsen’s “messaging” rationale is not presented as an independent 
justification for rescission). 
 175.  See supra Part II.B. 
 176.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 29.  
 177.  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 178.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 9, at 28. 
 179.  See Regents of Univ. Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 498 (9th Cir. 
2018) (noting that judicial review over Executive action is essential for democratic responsiveness 
and public accountability). 
